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Abstract 
The law is clear that it is the plaintiff-patentee’s burden to prove both 
infringement and damages.  It is unclear, however, in cases involving 
inconsistent manufacturing techniques, what level of evidence is required to 
meet this burden and when, if at all, such burden should pass to the 
defendant-infringer to provide rebuttal evidence.  One consideration in this 
analysis is when findings of infringement can extend to the entire product 
line. Another matter considered in this paper is how the court deals with the 
confusion of goods and the commingling of records.  This Article examines 
the various patent doctrines that may have some bearing on these issues, 
analyzes the relevant and analogous statutory law and case law, and, 





Shifting the Burden: Proving Infringement 
and Damages in Patent Cases Involving 
Inconsistent Manufacturing Techniques 
 by JULIE E. ZINK 
I. Introduction 
The law is clear that it is the plaintiff-patentee’s burden to prove 
both infringement and damages.  It is unclear, however, in cases 
involving inconsistent manufacturing techniques, what level of 
evidence is required to meet this burden and when such burden 
should pass to the defendant-infringer to provide rebuttal evidence.  
For example, imagine that you represent the plaintiff-patentee, Astral 
Technologies, in a patent infringement lawsuit against Illusion 
Beverages.1  Astral owns a patent on a beverage composition.  
Illusion manufactures and sells beverage products in hundreds of 
plants across the country.  In advance of filing the complaint, Astral 
collected and tested beverages manufactured in one of Illusion’s 
several hundred manufacturing plants, and determined that the 
beverages made at that plant were infringing Astral’s patent.  During 
discovery, Illusion’s CEO explained that Illusion’s beverages were 
not manufactured consistently.  Thus, while Illusion admits that some 
plants may manufacture infringing products, others plants do not.   
This situation poses many questions.  For example, is Astral’s 
testing of beverages manufactured at one of Illusion’s plants sufficient to 
prove infringement?  If so, will those findings extend to Illusion’s entire 
 
   Julie E. Zink, Associate Professor of Lawyering Skills at the University of 
Dayton School of Law (“UDSL”).  As part of UDSL’s Program in Law & Technology, 
Professor Zink has taught legal research and writing to the first-year law students enrolled 
in the Intellectual Property, Cyberlaw & Creativity Track.  Professor Zink also teaches 
courses on patent litigation and appellate practice and procedure.  The author wishes to 
thank Kathryn Ng and Rebecca Greendyke for their research and citation assistance.  The 
author also wishes to thank her colleagues, Professors Tracy Reilly, Kelly Henrici, Ria 
Farrell-Schalnat, and John Fischer, for their helpful comments and support.   
 1. The named parties in this hypothetical are fictional.   
_ 
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product line?  At what point, if any, does the burden shift to Illusion to 
prove which plants are not manufacturing infringing products?  And how 
does this situation affect the damages determination?   
This Article examines the various patent doctrines that may have 
some bearing on these issues.  Section II discusses the plaintiff-
patentee’s burden to prove infringement and burden-shifting 
mechanisms—that have been used in certain circumstances over the 
years.  Section III explores the cases that have dealt with the extension 
of infringement findings to an entire product line.  Section IV provides 
background on the burden of proof as to damages, before moving, in 
Section V, to the principle of confusion of goods and the commingling 
of records.  Drawing on this information, Section VI provides answers 
to the questions posed above and provides guidance on how to handle 
cases involving inconsistent manufacturing techniques.   
II. The Burden of Proof as to Infringement 
Since at least as early as 1879, the burden of proof as to 
infringement has been placed on the patentee.2  To prove infringement, 
the patentee must show, by the preponderance of the evidence,3 that all 
of the elements of the asserted patent claim(s) are present in the 
accused product or process.4  In doing so, the patentee may rely on 
 
 2. Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 662 (1879) (“[T]he burden to prove 
infringement never shifts if the charge is denied in the plea or answer.”).  Accord Jazz 
Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The initial 
burden is upon the complainant to establish its cause of action, here patent infringement; 
the patentee must present evidence sufficient to establish that one or more patent claims 
are infringed.”); Nutrinova Nutrition Specialities & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Int’l. 
Trade Comm’n., 224 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As a general proposition, the law 
places the burden of proving infringement on the patentee who alleges it.”).   
 3. Centricut, L.L.C. v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The 
patentee has the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.”); 
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Infringement 
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”); SRI Int’l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. 
of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The patentee bears the burden of proving 
infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.”).  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 
(6th ed. 1990) (“[P]reponderance of the evidence” is defined as “evidence which is of 
greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; 
that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more 
probable than not.”). 
 4. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n accused device may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable 
of satisfying the claim limitations.”); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura L.P., 112 F.3d 1146, 
1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“In order for there to be infringement, each and every limitation set 
forth in a patent claim must be found in the accused product, either literally or under the 
doctrine of equivalents.”); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 
_ 
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testimonial or other evidence, as well as appropriate inferences and 
admissions.5  Once the patentee has proven infringement the burden 
shifts to the accused infringer to prove non-infringement.6 
The law, however, makes exceptions.  In certain situations, the 
burden shifts to the accused infringer before infringement is proven.7  
In 1988, such burden-shifting was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 2958 as to 
process patents because accused infringers are in a better position to 
determine the actual processes they use in the manufacture of 
products.9  Under that statute, once the court finds that (1) a 
substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the 
 
1991) (“[T]he failure to meet a single limitation is sufficient to negate infringement of the 
claim . . . .”); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is . . .  
well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a 
court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element . . .  in 
the accused device.”). 
 5. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he jury could reasonably have inferred from the engineering manual and [witness] 
testimony that 11 installations infringe even though some structural data is missing from 
[defendant’s] records.”; “[a] patentee may prove direct infringement or inducement of 
infringement by either direct or circumstantial evidence.”); Chiuminatta Concrete 
Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 1 Fed. App’x. 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Proof of 
inducing infringement or direct infringement may be shown by circumstantial evidence.”).  
 6. SRI Int’l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123–24 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“When a patentee establishes literal infringement, the accused infringer may 
undertake the burden of going forward to establish the fact of non-infringement . . . .”).  
See also Ecolab, Inc. v. Amerikem Labs., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 569, 583 (D. N.J. 2000) 
(“Ecolab’s compelling evidence of infringement shifts the burden of production and 
obliges Envirochem to point to the existence of any genuine issues of material fact.”).   
 7. For example, “[t]he burden of production of evidence may shift to the accused 
infringer on some issues, such as experimental purpose and implied license.”  5A Donald 
S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, § 18.06, p.1 (2009).   
 8.  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 100 P.L. 418, 9005-06, 102 Stat. 
1107, 1566–67 (Aug. 23, 1988).  35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006) provides that “[i]n actions alleging 
infringement of a process patent based on the importation, sale, offer for sale, or use of a 
product which is made from a process patented in the United States, if the court finds – 
(1) that a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented process, 
and (2) that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process actually 
used in the production of the product and was unable so to determine, the product shall be 
presumed to have been so made, and the burden of establishing that the product was not 
made by the process shall be on the party asserting that it was not so made.” 
 9. See Jeffrey I. D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg:  Pre-Suit 
Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y (2002) (“The underlying principal here is that the alleged infringer is in a far 
better position to determine the actual process used in the manufacture of the product 
than the patentee.  Once the patentee has demonstrated that there is some merit to his 
claim by a substantial likelihood showing, fairness dictates that the defendant, who is the 
only party with access to the actual manufacturing process used to produce the accused 
product, reveal that process.). 
_ 
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patented process, and (2) the patentee made a reasonable, albeit 
unsuccessful, effort to determine the process used, the burden shifts 
to the alleged infringer to disprove infringement.10  
A half century earlier, a similar form of burden-shifting was 
utilized by the Sixth Circuit, in Automotive Parts Co. v. Wisconsin 
Axle Co.,11 with regard to the claimed reconstruction of a patented 
product.12  In that case, the Sixth Circuit placed the burden of proof 
on the alleged infringer to show that its sales were for proper 
purposes of repair.13  The court acknowledged that the burden of 
proving patent infringement normally rests upon the plaintiff-
patentee.  The court found that when it is difficult for the patentee to 
ascertain the necessary facts to prove infringement, and when such 
facts are in the possession of the alleged infringer that the burden 
should shift to the alleged infringer.14  However, the Sixth Circuit 
made it clear in Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hesser,15 that such 
burden-shifting should not occur in situations where the plaintiff-
patentee could easily determine whether the defendant’s customers 
engaged in impermissible reconstruction.16   
 
 10. Id.  Accord Nutrinova Nutrition Specialities & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Int’l. 
Trade Comm’n., 224 F.3d 1356, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The statute on its face is a 
burden shifting mechanism.  As a general proposition, the law places the burden of 
proving infringement on the patentee who alleges it.  When two conditions are met, the 
statute shifts that burden and requires the alleged infringer to disprove infringement.”). 
 11. 81 F.2d 125, 127–28 (6th Cir. 1935). 
 12. For an explanation of the distinction between permissible repair and 
impermissible reconstruction, see generally Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary 
Aswad & Joseph S. Cianfrani, How Much Fuel to Add to the Fire of Genius?  Some 
Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction in Patent Law, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 
1205 (Aug. 1999). 
 13. Automotive Parts, 81 F.2d at 128.   
 14. Id. at 127–28 (“Ordinarily the burden rests upon the plaintiff to show patent 
infringement, but in circumstances such as are here disclosed, where there is an admission 
of sales without reservation as to the number sold for a single axle, or the condition of the 
original parts in any such axle, it would seem only fair that the seller should assume the 
burden of showing that its acts were not infringements.  It would be difficult for the 
appellee to ascertain the facts necessary to the determination of that question.”); Accord 
Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Automotive Parts Co., 93 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1937) (holding that 
defendant met its burden of showing that its contemplated sales would not be 
infringement by offering evidence that the parts it contemplated selling would be sold for 
no other purpose than repairs).   
 15. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hesser, 131 F.2d 406, 409 (6th Cir. 1942).  
 16. Id. (finding that “[t]he principle which permits a court of equity to place the 
burden of disclosure upon the defendant does not here apply” because the sales were few 
in number and made to nearby institutions, such that “plaintiff had equal opportunity with 
the defendant to ascertain whether the parts purchased were used for reconstruction or 
repair”).  The burden has also shifted in cases in which the alleged infringer, rather than 
_ 
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III. Extension of Infringement Findings 
to the Entire Product Line  
Only a handful of cases have discussed the extrapolation of 
infringement findings to other products in the product line.  In the 
first case, San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade 
Comm’n.,17 the patentee proved infringement of a patent claiming 
magnet alloys with 6,000 to 35,000 parts per million oxygen, 30 
percent to 36 percent rare earth element, and 60 percent to 66 percent 
iron.  The Federal Circuit held that, even though the patentee did a 
complete analysis of only one magnet in the group, the United States 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”)18 did not err in finding 
infringement by another group of magnets.19  The Federal Circuit 
ruled that there was no error because tests of the oxygen content of 
magnets of the same type, size, and grade showed average oxygen 
content well within the claim limitation.20   
The next court to make a similar determination provided slightly 
more guidance.  In Ecolab, Inc. v. Amerikem Laboratories, Inc. the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey extended 
test results to other products in the product line by stating that 
“[g]eneral arguments that each alleged infringing product must be 
tested do not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact.”21  In 
this case there was uncontroverted evidence that extrapolating test 
results based on formula and production specification would yield 
reliable, accurate results.  The court held that any finding of 
infringement would extend to the other products in the product line, 
with the exception of one product in which the court found no 
 
claiming non-infringement, claimed that its use of the patented invention was for an 
excusable experimental purpose, Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (holding that the scope of the experimental use exception is markedly narrow and 
that a defendant bears the burden of proving its applicability), or was permitted under an 
implied license, Intel Corp. v. U.S. Intl. Trade Commn., 946 F.2d 821, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(finding that Atmel had not established the existence of an implied license, the court 
proceeded with validity and infringement analyses).   
 17. 161 F.3d 1347, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 18. See About the USITC, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last 
visited on Nov. 11, 2009) (“The United States International Trade Commission is an 
independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad investigative responsibilities on 
matters of trade.  The agency investigates the effects of dumped and subsidized imports on 
domestic industries and conducts global safeguard investigations.  The Commission also 
adjudicates cases involving imports that allegedly infringe intellectual property rights.”). 
 19. San Huan, 161 F.3d 1347, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
 20. Id. 
 21. 98 F. Supp. 2d 569, 583 (D.N.J. 2000). 
_ 
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evidence to suggest that the tested products were representative.22  
Once the patentee proved infringement of one of the products in the 
product line, the court shifted the burden to the infringer to refute the 
extension of those test results to the remainder of the product line.23  
In the final case—Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface 
Architectural Resources, Inc.24—the district court granted summary 
judgment despite defendant’s argument that, due to quality control 
problems, not all of defendant’s floor panels were beveled and would, 
therefore, fall outside of the asserted patent claim.  The court made 
its decision based on two findings: (1) defendant’s infringement was 
complete with its offer to sell the infringing panels, which it did; and 
(2) “it is [defendant’s] burden to establish how many of its panels 
infringed or else it bears the whole risk.”25 
A. San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade 
Comm’n. 
Originally, the San Huan defendants—San Huan New Materials 
High Tech, Ningbo Konit Industries, and Tridus International 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “San Huan”)—were three of 
eight alleged infringers named in YBM Magnex’s complaint filed with 
 
 22. Id.  See also id. at 583 n.34 (“Without a specific product formula sheet, there is no 
permissible basis to extrapolate Dr. Lentsch’s or Dr. Rigney’s findings to this product.”).   
 23. Id. (“Ecolab’s compelling evidence of infringement shifts the burden of 
production and obliges Envirochem to point to the existence of any genuine issues of 
material fact.”). 
 24. 185 F. Supp. 2d 588, 597 n.7 (D. Md. 2002).  For purposes of full disclosure, the 
author represented Plaintiff Tate Access Floors, Inc. in this case. 
 25. Id. (citing Nickson Industries, Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)).  Compare Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Global ID Sys., which stands for the 
proposition that it is inappropriate to shift the burden of proof on the number of infringing 
products to defendant.  No. 00-1573, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1991, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 
2002) (“Although the damages calculation may have been more accurate if GIDS’s 
business records were not missing, the district court did not find that missing records were 
the result of bad faith by GIDS.  In the absence of such bad faith, it was inappropriate to 
shift the burden to GIDS to prove that not all 569 Readers were sold in the United States.  
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the number of infringing Readers 
sold or used in the United States, it was error for the district court to grant judgment for 
the plaintiffs on this issue.”) 
The case did not indicate that the allegedly infringing products were made using 
inconsistent manufacturing techniques.   The major dilemma seemed to be that some of 
the products were sold outside of the United States, which would not qualify as infringing 
acts.  Id. at *2–3 (Defendant “admits he resold some Readers but he claims those were 
sold to buyers outside the United States.  However, Avid claims that some were sold to a 
domestic Avid customer.”).  Thus, the court found that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the number of infringing products sold or used in the United States.  Id. 
at *11.   
_ 
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the ITC.26  During the ITC’s investigation and after the ITC denied 
San Huan’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement,27 San 
Huan “unilaterally proposed and voluntarily entered into” a Consent 
Order.28  In the Consent Order, San Huan agreed not to sell for 
import, import into the United States, or sell in the United States any 
“neodymium-iron-boron magnets which infringe any of the claims 1-3 
of the ‘439 Patent.”29  Subsequently, the ITC terminated its 
investigation with regard to San Huan.30  The investigation continued 
with regard to the remaining five respondents.  This investigation 
concluded with the ITC determining that “magnets with oxygen 
contents measured between 5,450 ppm and 6,000 ppm infringed the 
‘439 patent,”31 and that the remaining respondents violated Section 
337 of the Tariff Act through their infringement of the ‘439 patent.32   
Approximately five months after the Consent Order was 
entered, YBM filed an enforcement complaint against San Huan for 
continued importation and sale of infringing magnets in violation of 
the Order.33  The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held that San 
Huan “violated the Consent Order in bad faith by continuing 
unabated infringement after entering into the Consent Order.”34  The 
ITC adopted the ALJ’s recommendation with three exceptions, none 
of which were related to the extrapolation of test results to other 
products in the product line or to other product lines.35  San Huan 
 
 26. San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1348–49.   
 27. Id. at 1349, 1358.   
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 1355, 1349.  Under the terms of the Consent Order, San Huan was 
“precluded from . . .  challenging or otherwise contesting the validity of the consent 
order.”  Id. at 1358.  “By entering into the Consent Order, San Huan waived its rights to 
challenge determinations reached in the original investigation, for which litigation was 
continuing as to the other respondents.”  Id. 
 30. Id. at 1349. 
 31. Id. at 1357.   
 32. San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1349.   
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 1350.  The exceptions were as follows:  (1) the decision in Maxwell v. J. 
Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996) “precluded access to the doctrine of 
equivalents”; (2) the ALJ’s misconstruction of one of the claim phrases; and (3) the 
determination of the date on which San Huan was required to cease importation and sales 
of magnets.  Id.   
_ 
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appealed the ITC’s decision to the Federal Circuit on numerous 
grounds.36  The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision.37 
With respect to the determinations made by the ITC during the 
enforcement proceedings, San Huan argued that there was not 
substantial evidence of infringement.38  Specifically, San Huan asserted 
that the ITC “improperly assumed that the T25 magnets would have 
the same chemical composition as magnets of the same size and grade 
as the T25 magnets,” despite the fact that there was “no basis in the 
record for assuming the magnets from different batches [would] have 
the same chemical composition.”39  The Federal Circuit found the ITC’s 
determination to be reasonable.40  This decision rested on the finding 
that while “oxygen levels could vary between magnets of the same size 
and grade,”41 there was “no reason to believe that one sample would be 
outside the claimed ranges for TRE and iron if the tested samples were 
comfortably within the claimed ranges.”42   
As to the E63B, NE1C, E152F, and T41 magnet groups, YBM 
conducted complete chemical analyses on one magnet from each 
group, while taking additional measurements from other magnets in 
the groups.43  San Huan argued that the complete chemical analysis 
showed that the oxygen content for the tested magnets was outside 
the claimed ranges and, therefore, not infringing.44  The Federal 
Circuit dismissed this argument, finding “substantial evidence of 
infringement.”45  For example, the court stated that “[t]he E63B# 2 
 
 36. Id.  On appeal, San Huan made the following arguments:  (1) the ITC had “no 
authority to impose civil penalties”; (2) San Huan had “a right to a trial de novo in district 
court” relating to YBM’s infringement claims, violation of the Consent Order, and the 
amount of any penalty; (3) the ITC had “no authority to impose civil penalties for 
violation of a consent order”; (4) “there was not substantial evidence to support the 
[ITC’s] infringement determinations”; and (5) “the penalty imposed [was] constitutionally 
excessive and without reasoned basis.”  Id.  
 37. Id. at 1348, 1365.   
 38. Id. at 1358.   
 39. Id. at 1360.   
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  San Huan presented chemical analyses for oxygen only.  Id.  While it is not 
clear from the opinion, one can presume that the ITC relied on the oxygen content 
provided by San Huan, while relying on YBM’s findings for TRE and iron contents.  
 42. San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Moleculon Research Corp. v. 
CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986) for the proposition that “infringement may 
be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence”).  
 43. San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
 44. Id.   
 45. Id. at 1361–62.   
_ 
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magnet was shown to contain iron, TRE, and boron within the 
claimed levels,” and that while “[t]he average oxygen reading for 
E63B# 2 was not within the claimed range . . . the average oxygen 
readings for two magnets of the same size, grade, and type, and from 
the same shipment were within the claimed range.”46   
The Federal Circuit then looked to the ITC’s determination that 
“of the number of magnets tested by YBM, a certain percentage were 
infringing.”47  The ITC “used this percentage to approximate the sales 
value of magnets that actually infringed,” explaining that YBM 
“made a good faith effort to prove the extent of [San Huan’s] 
violation of the consent order.”48  The ITC further stated that YBM 
“was not required . . . to test every magnet sold by respondents,” and, 
in fact, “could not be expected to have test data on a magnet from 
each lot shipped to the United States or sold to a U.S. customer 
since . . . the consent order became effective.”49  Ultimately, the ITC 
found that “the record demonstrates that [YBM] tested a substantial 
and clearly representative share of [San Huan’s] magnets.”50  The 
Federal Circuit agreed that the ITC’s “approach was reasonable, and 
must be sustained.”51  The Federal Circuit further noted that, 
“[c]onsidering all the circumstances, any inaccuracy in the [ITC’s] 
computations was at least partly attributable to San Huan.”52  In 
support, the court cited Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp.,53 for the 
proposition that “[w]hen calculation of damages is impeded by 
 
 46. Id.  Similarly, the court found that “[t]he iron/TRE/boron readings for NEIC# 3 
constitute[d] substantial circumstantial evidence of iron/TRE/boron content for NE1C# 4, 
whose oxygen level was found to be within the claimed limits.”  Id. 
 47. Id. at 1362.  The ITC’s determination was “based on a summary of YBM’s 
evidence prepared by San Huan.”  Id.  The ITC “took the total number of magnets with 
oxygen readings above 5,450 ppm according to YBM’s tests and divided this number by 
the total number of magnets tested by YBM.”  Id. at 1364. 
 48. Id. at 1362.   
 49. San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  See also id. at 1364 (“The [ITC] 
states that YBM was not required to test every magnet, and that it would have been 
impossible for YBM to have done so, since San Huan often shipped magnets directly to 
customers in the United States without maintaining any samples for testing, despite the 
existence of the Consent Order.”).   
 50. Id. at 1363.   
 51. Id.   
 52. Id. at 1364 (“The ITC “attribute[d] any inconsistency and inaccuracy to San 
Huan, because for certain infringing magnets, San Huan provided no records whatsoever 
of their composition.”). 
 53. 81 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
_ 
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incomplete records of the infringer, adverse inferences are 
appropriately drawn.”54 
B. Ecolab, Inc. v. Amerikem Laboratories, Inc. 
The Ecolab case arose out of Ecolab’s assertion that the line of 
dishwashing products manufactured by Amerikem/Envirochem 
infringed Claim 1 of Ecolab’s ‘818 patent.55  After the court construed 
the contested claim terms (specifically, the requirement that the 
detergent be “substantially uniform”), Ecolab moved for summary 
judgment of literal infringement as to eight of Envirochem’s 
detergent products.56  In support of its summary judgment motion, 
Ecolab submitted the analyses of the “pertinent Envirochem 
products” by two Ecolab scientists.57  Based on their findings, both 
scientists concluded that the Envirochem products were 
“substantially uniform,” and thus infringed that element of claim 1.58  
Envirochem opposed the motion, contending that its products were 
nonuniform detergents and, therefore, noninfringing.59  
Envirochem attacked these findings on several grounds.60  Of 
particular relevance, Envirochem asserted that Ecolab’s expert 
opinions were “inherently and fatally flawed” because the “Ecolab 
scientists did not test every alleged infringing product in the 
Envirochem product line.”61  Ecolab, on the other hand, argued that 
 
 54. San Huan, 161 F.3d at 1364; Sensonics, 81 F.3d at 1572. 
 55. 98 F. Supp. 2d 570. 
 56. Id. at 571.   
 57. Id. at 572–73.   
 58. Id. at 573.   
 59. Id.   
 60. See Ecolab, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (Among other things, Envirochem argued that 
the opinion of Ecolab’s expert was “the result of incompetent, unreliable ‘junk science’ 
and should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702.”);  However, Envirochem submitted no 
contrary expert testimony or evidence to support its argument.  Id. at 577.  Therefore, 
because the methodology used by Ecolab’s expert followed Ecolab’s standard practice and 
was validated by Envirochem’s product literature, the court found that it was reliable.  Id. 
at 576–77, 581.   
 61. Id. at 579.  But see id. at 578 (“Envirochem [ ] presented no testimony to suggest 
that it [was] improper to extrapolate the results from representative products.”) and id. at 
583 (“Envirochem has not put forth any evidence to suggest that such an extrapolation is 
inappropriate or yields distorted results.”).  “Envirochem also question[ed] the testing of 
only a single sample of any particular product.”  Id. at 577 n.21.  In support of this 
argument, Envirochem relied on the testimony of another Ecolab scientist regarding “the 
difficulties with testing a single sample.”  Id.  However, the court did not find this 
argument to be persuasive because the testimony merely “critique[d] Envirochem’s 
quality control procedures.”  Id. 
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because “each of Envirochem’s products [was] produced in the same 
way according to nearly identical formulae, Ecolab’s researchers 
properly extrapolated their findings to the entire product line.”62  
Ecolab’s experts “agreed that their test results did not reveal whether 
the tested samples were representative of either the particular 
product or the other products within the product line.”63  The court 
nonetheless found that, because each product in the product line “was 
prepared following a virtually identical formula and in accordance with 
a standard production method,” the tested samples were 
representative.64  Since the results were representative the court found 
that “Ecolab’s extrapolated results satisfy[ied] the threshold reliability 
requirement.”65  Thus, the court held that Ecolab met its burden of 
proving infringement of the “substantially uniform” element of claim 1 
of the ‘818 patent.66  The district court found that because Envirochem 
did not point to “any evidence to contradict the finding that the other 
elements of claim 1 read on the Envirochem products” that “no 
genuine issues of material fact exist[ed].”67  Ecolab was accordingly 
“entitled to summary judgment of literal infringement on all products 
in the Envirochem solid cast detergent product line at issue, with the 
exception of product number E2000XHW.”68  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court erred 
in construing the claim term “substantially uniform.”69  As a result, the 
Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment of literal 
infringement, and remanded the case to the district court for further 
 
 62. Id. at 577. 
 63. Id.   
 64. Id. at 578. 
 65. Id.  See also id. at 582–83 (“[T]he entire product line was produced according to a 
virtually identical formula (with differences only in immaterial components) and according 
to the same production method.  Based upon that information, both Ecolab experts 
concluded that the untested products would yield identical results evidencing substantial 
uniformity.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 66. Id. at 585.   
 67. Id. at 586. 
 68. Id.  The court did not extend its liability findings to product number E2000XHW 
because Ecolab did not submit any evidence that the tested products were representative 
of the E2000XHW product.  Id. at 583 n.34 (“Without a specific product formula sheet, 
there is no permissible basis to extrapolate Dr. Lentsch’s or Dr. Rigney’s [Ecolab’s 
experts] findings to this product.  The statement by Ecolab’s counsel that the two products 
are identical is not evidence, and the E2000X formula sheet describing the product as 
‘Enviro 2000 XHW Solid’ does not suffice to show that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether E2000XHW infringes.”). 
 69. Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).   
_ 
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proceedings.70  However, the Federal Circuit did not make any 
judgment regarding the district court’s approval of the extrapolation of 
Ecolab’s test results to the remainder of Envirochem’s product line.   
C. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc. 
After winning a previous infringement battle on the same patent 
against another rival,71 Tate sued Interface for infringement of its 
patent for an elevated floor panel with integral trim, and 
subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction.72  Thereafter, the 
court granted Tate’s motion for summary judgment of infringement.73   
Tate’s patent covered an access floor panel with “a border along 
the edges of said panel along which said decorative surface layer is 
removed to expose said inner body portion and thereby provide an 
integral contrasting border around said decorative surface layer.”74  
The court found that “[i]n addition to the preferred embodiment 
likely having a section of its border created by a beveled edge, the 
specification teaches to scarf or cut away the floor covering, which 
would be satisfied by beveling.”75  Although “Interface describe[d] its 
untrimmed accused panel, sold under the trade name Bevel Edge, as 
‘beveled,’” it argued that, due to quality control problems, not all of 
its panels were, in fact, beveled.76  As evidence of these “quality 
control problems,” Interface submitted deposition testimony and 
documentation that “there were no written standards” and “grinding 
depth was controlled by humans rather than machines.”77   
The court dismissed Interface’s arguments, stating that 
“Interface’s infringement was complete with its offer to sell the 
infringing panels, which they did in their sales materials.”78  The court 
further stated that “it is Interface’s burden to establish how many of 
 
 70. Id.  Presumably, the litigation settled thereafter, as there were no subsequent 
decisions in this case.   
 71. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., 222 F.3d 958, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2000).   
 72. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 365, 
367 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d, 279 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 73. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 588, 
607 (D. Md. 2002). 
 74. U.S. Patent No. 4,625,491 col.5 ll.8-11 (filed Jan. 13, 1986). 
 75. Tate Access Floors, 185 F. Supp. at 596.   
 76. Id. at 593, 597 n.7.   
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 597 n.7 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).  “In one brochure, Interface advertises 
the panel as follows:  ‘the top of the high pressure laminate is beveled to create a grid 
pattern without the use of separate edge trim pieces.’”  Id. at 593.   
_ 
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its panels infringed or else it bears the whole risk.”79  Unfortunately, 
the court’s analysis on this point was limited to one footnote.  
However, the related concept of damages provides additional insight 
as to how to handle such issues in litigation.   
IV. The Burden of Proof as to Damages 
35 U.S.C. § 284 provides for the recovery of compensatory 
damages as the primary monetary remedy for patent infringement—
“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event 
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”80  “The 
basic theory of damages is to make the patent owner whole for losses 
caused by the infringer’s illicit activity.  The patent owner is to be 
restored financially to the position he would have occupied but for the 
infringement.”81  The award should not unfairly penalize the infringer.82   
Similar to its claim of patent infringement, the patent owner 
bears the burden of proving its damages by a preponderance of the 
evidence.83  Such determinations should be based on evidence, not 
 
 79. Id. at 597 n.7 (citing Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 799 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988)). 
 80. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  If Congress passes the Patent Reform Act as currently 
proposed, Section 284 will be revised in such a manner that “the court shall conduct an 
analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the portion of the economic 
value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s 
specific contribution over the prior art.”  S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 284(c)(1)(C) (2008).  
Accord H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 284(b)(2) (2007) (“Upon a showing to the satisfaction of 
the court that a reasonable royalty should be based on a portion of the value of the 
infringing product or process, the court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a 
reasonable royalty under subsection (a) is applied only to that economic value properly 
attributable to the patent’s specific contribution over the prior art.”). 
 81. 7 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, § 20.03, p. 20–66 (2003).   
 82. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 408 (1940) (“Equity is 
concerned with making a fair apportionment so that neither party will have what justly 
belongs to the other.”). 
 83. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he patent owner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
quantum of damages.”); Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The patentee bears the burden of proving its damages by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”); Accord Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument 
Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“In order to recover lost profits a patentee 
must show a reasonable probability that, but for the infringement, it would have made the 
sales that were made by the infringer . . . .  The patent owner’s burden of proof is not an 
absolute one, although liability does not extend to speculative profits.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
_ 
94 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
conjecture.84  However, as discussed in Section IV below, “[w]hen the 
amount of the damages is not ascertainable with precision, reasonable 
doubt is appropriately resolved against the infringer.”85  This 
sentiment is echoed in cases of trademark and copyright 
infringement, as well as unfair competition.86  For instance, in William 
Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co.,87 the court was asked to 
determine what proportion of the defendant’s profit was due to the 
use of plaintiff’s trademark.  The court found that such proportion 
could not be ascertained with any reasonable certainty.88  Therefore, 
the court held that  
 
it is more consonant with reason and justice that the owner of 
the trade-mark should have the whole profit than that he should 
be deprived of any part of it by the fraudulent act of the 
defendant.  It is the same principle which is applicable to a 
confusion of goods.  If one wrongfully mixes his own goods with 
those of another, so that they cannot be distinguished and 
 
 84. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 490 (1853) (“Actual damages must be 
actually proved, and cannot be assumed as a legal inference from any facts which amount 
not to actual proof of the fact . . . .  The question is not what speculatively [the patentee] 
may have lost, but what actually he did lose.”); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States 
Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“[W]hile the damages may not be 
determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows the 
extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be 
only approximate.”). 
 85. Del Mar Avionics, 836 F.2d at 1327.   
 86. William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F.2d 731, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1925) 
(“The rule governing the rights of parties and the rule as to the measure of recovery, in 
cases of infringement of patents and cases of unfair competition, are quite similar.”); 
Sammons v. Larkin, 38 F. Supp. 649, 654 (D. Mass. 1940) (finding that, although not all of 
defendant’s profits were attributable to material copied from the plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
works, the court held that defendant was liable for his entire net profit because he “made 
no attempt to show the extent of his contribution so that the profits could be separated”); 
Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 843, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (rejecting 
defendant’s request to reduce damages because “defendant made no effort to establish 
what part of the gross receipts were attributable to factors other than the [plaintiff’s] 
manuscript nor to establish any deductions from the gross receipts . . .”); Gaste v. 
Kaiserman, 683 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (confirming the jury’s findings that the 
defendant’s song “Feelings” infringed plaintiff’s copyright and that defendant was not 
entitled to an apportionment of profits because it “deliberately chose not to produce a 
single document from its books and records to substantiate any alleged expenses”). 
 87. 5 F.2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 1925).  
 88. Id. at 738–39.  Compare Westinghouse Elec. and Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. and 
Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 620 (1912) (“The rule, however, is not intended to penalize the 
infringer, nor to give the patentee profits to which he is clearly not entitled . . . .  In such 
cases, except possibly against one who has concealed or destroyed evidence or been guilty 
of gross wrong, the plaintiff’s recovery cannot exceed the amount thus proved, even 
though it be impossible otherwise more precisely to apportion the profits.”). 
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separated, he shall lose the whole, for the reason that the fault is 
his; and it is but just that he should suffer the loss, rather than 
an innocent party, who in no degree contributed to the wrong.89 
 
This wrongful mixing of goods can arise in cases where one 
commingles infringing and non-infringing parts within one product.90  It 
may also arise in situations where one commingles records such that it is 
impossible to distinguish infringing and non-infringing products.91  As 
such, the confusion of goods doctrine can be instructive in dealing with 
cases involving inconsistent manufacturing processes.  Section V 
provides a more in-depth exploration of the law in this area.   
V. Confusion of Goods and Commingling of Records 
The principle of confusion of goods was instituted to ensure that 
patentees would “not be penalized by the infringer’s failure to keep 
records necessary to compute damages.”92  Therefore, if a party 
commingles his goods such that they cannot be separated, that party 
may be liable for all of the goods.93  If it is impossible for the patent 
 
 89. William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F.2d 731, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1925) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 
261 (1916)).  
 90. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric & Mfg. Co., 225 
U.S. 604 (1912); Computing Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co., 279 F. 648 (7th Cir. 
1921); Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md. 1963). 
 91. See, e.g., Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Hartford Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353 (D. Del. 1960). 
 92. 7 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, § 20.03[3][c][i], pp. 20-246 to 20-247 
(2003).  See also National Car-Brake Shoe Co. v. Terra Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 19 F. 514, 
519 (D. Ind. 1884) (stating that the principle of confusion of goods is applicable when “a 
party who mixes his goods with another man’s, so that they cannot be separated, is liable 
to lose his own goods with those that he commingles with them”).  See also Seeger 
Refrigerator Co. v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 219 F. 565, 569 (3d Cir. 1915) (quoting 
Westinghouse Elec. and Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. and Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. at 618 (1912)) 
(stating that if it is impossible to make a separation of the profits, the doctrine of 
confusion of goods applies and “the law places the loss on the wrongdoer”).   
 93. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 405–06 (1940) 
(“Where there is a commingling of gains, [the infringer] must abide the consequences, 
unless he can make a separation of the profits so as to assure to the injured party all that 
justly belongs to him.”); The Idaho, 93 U.S. 575, 585–86 (1876) (“[I]f a man willfully and 
wrongfully mixes his own goods with those of another owner, so as to render them 
undistinguishable, he will not be entitled to his proportion, or any part, of the 
property . . . .  Such intermixture is a fraud.”); Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 
1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“When the calculation of damages is impeded by incomplete 
records of the infringer, adverse inferences are appropriately drawn.”); Stryker Corp. v. 
Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 751, 818 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“the risk of 
uncertainty in calculating damages is borne by the wrongdoer instead of the injured 
_ 
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owner to distinguish between infringing and non-infringing uses, then 
the burden shifts to the infringer to show what percentage of sales 
were not infringing.94   
The leading case relating to the principle of confusion of goods is 
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric & Mfg. Co.95  
The case involved the infringement of Westinghouse’s patent on a 
means of preventing overheating in electric transformers.96  The 
defendant-infringer, Wagner, sold transformers containing all of the 
claimed elements, but added an additional feature.97  After the lower 
courts determined that the additional feature was a valuable 
improvement, they held that Westinghouse, having failed to 
distinguish the profits generated from the infringing and non-
infringing features of Wagner’s transformers, was only entitled to 
nominal damages.98   
 
party”), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, 
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1047, 1056 (D. Del. 1986) (“Where an infringer’s failure to keep 
complete and accurate records prevents a court from determining accurately the number 
of infringing units involved, any uncertainty must be resolved against the infringer.”).   
 94. Variable-Parameter Fixture Dev. Corp. v. Morpheus Lights, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16753, *21–23 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (“In patent infringement actions, the 
patent owner normally bears the burden of proof as to the amount of damages even after 
the fact of infringement has been proven.  However, where it is impossible for the patent 
owner to apportion between infringing and non-infringing sales, the burden shifts to the 
infringer to show what percentage of its sales were not infringing . . . .  [G]iven the 
circumstances in this case, it is fair to shift the burden of proof to defendants to establish 
that any portion of its revenues from the challenged lighting systems are attributable to 
non-infringing activity.”) (internal citations omitted).   
 95. 225 U.S. 604 (1912).  See also Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. 
Supp. 383, 397 (D. Md. 1963); Levin Bros. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 
1934).  The Court’s opinion in the Westinghouse case was based under the old law, which 
allowed recovery of profits as well as damages.  225 U.S. at 614 (“Where the infringer has 
sold or used a patented article, the plaintiff is entitled to recover all of the profits.”).  
Under the current law, the patentee is only entitled to “damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement.”  35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 96. Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 614.   
 97. Id. at 616 (“The plaintiff proved its patent and that it had been infringed by the 
defendant in the manufacture of several thousand transformers which sold for $955,000”; 
defendant then put forth evidence that the spaces added “were noninfringing and valuable 
improvements which had contributed to the making of the profits.”). 
 98. Id. at 614 (“The writ was issued in view of the holding that, though the Master 
found that the defendant had made a profit of $132,000 from the sale of infringing 
transformers, the plaintiff could yet only recover $1 because it failed to separate profits 
made by its patent from those made by the defendant’s addition.”) and 622 (stating that 
the lower court “found that the defendant’s additions were not infringements and had 
contributed to the profits, and that because of the failure to make a separation of profits 
the plaintiff was entitled only to nominal damages”).   
_ 
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In its reversal and remand of the case, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth several guidelines for later courts to follow.  
First, the Court made it clear that  
 
the burden is on the plaintiff patentee to prove profits; having 
done so, he is entitled to all the profits made from the sale of 
the infringing articles or devices, unless . . . the defendant 
infringer assumes the burden of showing that part of the profit 
is attributable to features other than those covered by the 
patent.99   
 
In other words, once the plaintiff has proven its case, “[t]he 
defendant ha[s] the right either to disprove the plaintiff’s case or to 
offer evidence in mitigation, or both.”100  If defendant presents such 
evidence, then the burden shifts back to the patentee to either prove 
the proper apportionment or that “the infringer, by commingling the 
elements, has rendered it impossible for the patentee to meet the 
requirement of apportionment.”101  If the patentee is successful, the 
burden shifts back to the defendant to introduce evidence regarding 
the proper apportionment.102  “The rule of law and equity is strict and 
severe on such occasion . . . .  All the inconveniences of the confusion 
is thrown upon the party who produces it, and it is for him to 
distinguish his own property or lose it.”103   
Following this instruction, the court, in Carter Prods., Inc. v. 
Colgate-Palmolive Co., found that Colgate “so commingled the 
elements” of plaintiffs’ patented invention and trade secret for a 
pressurized shaving cream that it was “impossible for plaintiffs to 
 
 99. Carter Prods., 214 F. Supp. at 397.  See Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 616 (“The 
plaintiff proved its patent and that it had been infringed by the defendant in the 
manufacture of several thousand transformers,” for which “defendant had netted 
$132,000.”).   
 100. Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 616.   
 101. Carter Prods., 214 F. Supp. at 397.  See also Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 617–18 
(stating that, if non-infringing improvements are found, “the burden of apportionment” 
should logically be placed on the plaintiff because plaintiff is “only entitled to recover such 
part of the commingled profits as [are] attributable to the use of its invention” and finding 
that “the act of the defendant had made it not merely difficult but impossible to carry the 
burden of apportionment”). 
 102. Carter Prods., 214 F. Supp. at 397 (“[I]f the patentee introduces proper evidence 
to show such confusion, it then devolves upon the infringer to introduce evidence of a 
proper apportionment.”). 
 103. Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 621–22 (citing Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 62 
(N.Y. Ch. 1816).   
_ 
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make an apportionment.”104  And, since Colgate could not provide 
evidence relating to the proper apportionment, the court held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to all of Colgate’s profits.105  In support of this 
decision, the court stated that “[w]here there is a commingling of 
gains, [the infringer] must abide the consequences, unless he can 
make a separation of the profits so as to assure to the injured party all 
that justly belongs to him.”106   
Similarly, in Computing Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale 
Co., the Seventh Circuit, citing to Westinghouse, stated that 
 
If a manufacturer, knowing of a patent, decides to chance an 
unlicensed use, he should realize that he may be caught by a 
final decree on the merits and be ordered to respond 
accordingly; and, so realizing, he should be held to the duty of 
keeping separate and accurate records of all his infringing acts; 
and, on his failure to keep such records, the court, in measuring 
the damages on account of his trespasses, should resolve all 
doubts against him.107  
 
The court further stated that 
 
[i]f a defendant satisfactorily states his profits from the 
infringing device, but contends that only a part thereof is 
attributable to the invention, he might well be required to 
allege in his account, taken as a verified pleading, the grounds 
on which he claims apportionment of profits, and his proofs 
should be limited to the averments.108   
 
 104. Carter Prods., 214 F. Supp. at 399 (finding that it was “impossible to make such 
apportionment, not only because Colgate’s books were not kept to show it, but also 
because, as the Master found, the superfatting ingredients called for by the 12(c) secret 
became an integral part of a unitary product and added commercial value to the product 
as a whole”).   
 105. Id. at 400. 
 106. Id. at 399.  Accord Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 620 (“On established principles of 
equity, and on the plainest principles of justice, the guilty trustee cannot take advantage of 
his own wrong.  The fact that he may lose something of his own is a misfortune which he 
has brought upon himself . . . .”); Hartford Nat’l. Bank & Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 
188 F. Supp. 353, 355 (D. Del. 1960) (“[P]laintiff argued that it was entitled to defendant’s 
entire gross profits because of commingling the processed product (covered by the patent) 
with other products sold by defendant and which made it impossible to apportion 
defendant’s profits from its total sales of all its products.”).  In Hartford, the court 
computed the reasonable royalty based on the total sales figure.  Id. at 360. 
 107. Computing Scale, 279 F. at 673 (emphasis added).  The role of the infringer’s 
intent is explored further below in the discussion regarding National Car-Brake Shoe Co. 
v. Terra Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 19 F. 514, 519–20 (D. Ind. 1884).   
 108. Id. at 674.   
_ 
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Based on these accounts, the confusion of goods doctrine seems 
quite beneficial for patentees.  However, there is a clear limit to its 
application—the doctrine does not apply when it is “merely difficult” 
for the plaintiff-patentee to discover facts that would enable it to 
separate the commingled devices.109  For example, in Nickson Indus., 
Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., the plaintiff-appellant asserted that a document 
produced in litigation (PX-1009) did not provide reasonable estimates 
of defendant-appellee’s sales of infringing and noninfringing hangers 
marketed under the same name (TPH-20).110  In this case, despite the 
plaintiff-appellant’s assertion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s determination that only 41percent of defendant-appellee’s 
hanger sales were infringing.111  In making its determination, the 
Federal Circuit stated that 
 
We agree that where it is “impossible to make a mathematical 
or approximate apportionment” between infringing and 
noninfringing items, the infringer must bear the burden and the 
entire risk.  That is not this case, however.  PX-1009 contains a 
mathematical formula, based on the weight difference between 
the infringing and noninfringing versions of TPH-20, and 
calculates the number of infringing TPH-20 hangers from the 
weight of raw material purchased and the total hangers sold.  
Nickson has identified no flaw that would have precluded the 
district court from relying on that analysis as a “reasonable 
approximation,” and in requiring Nickson to show otherwise.112 
 
Thus, if there is a reasonable method to apportion between infringing 
and noninfringing products, then the court will do so.   
 
 109. Seeger Refrigerator, 219 F. at 568–69 (citing Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 622).  The 
Supreme Court, in Westinghouse, understood that  
 
[i]t may be argued that . . .  this is but another way of saying that the burden of 
proof is on the defendant.  And no doubt such, in the end, will be the practical 
result in many cases.  But such burden is not imposed by law; nor is it so shifted 
until after the plaintiff has proved the existence of profits attributable to his 
invention and demonstrated that they are impossible of accurate or approximate 
apportionment.  If then the burden of separation is cast on the defendant it is one 
which justly should be borne by him, as he wrought the confusion.   
  
225 U.S. at 622. 
 110. 847 F.2d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 111. Id. 
 112. 847 F.2d at 799 (internal citations omitted). 
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As Computing Scale suggests, intent can also play a role in a 
court’s determination of whether to apply the principle of confusion 
of goods.  For example, in National Car-Brake Shoe Co. v. Terra 
Haute Car & Mfg. Co., the court provided the following instruction to 
the jury regarding the confusion of goods doctrine: 
 
If a party shows an unwillingness to let the truth out, and keeps 
back facts, and the means of getting at facts in his power, then 
the jury is warranted in drawing the strongest possible 
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence actually 
given in favor of the other party. . . .  But if they have brought 
forward their books, and furnished all the evidence in their 
power, and have been fairly candid in the matter, as much so as 
men may reasonably be expected to be when their interests are 
heavily at stake, you would not be justified in drawing any 
inferences, other than such as may fairly be drawn from the 
evidence adduced. . . .  It is only when a man consciously does 
wrong, and so does it as to conceal the facts, that he is subject to 
such criticism and to this harsh rule of evidence.113 
 
Ultimately, the determination of whether to apply the principle of 
confusion of goods may come down to the role of the parties in the 
litigation.  As the Supreme Court explained in Westinghouse, “[o]ne party 
or the other must suffer.  The inseparable profits must be given to the 
patentee or infringer.  The loss had to fall on the innocent or the guilty.  In 
such an alternative, the law places the loss on the wrongdoer.”114 
VI. Conclusion: Proving Infringement and Damages in Cases 
Involving Inconsistent Manufacturing Processes 
Returning to the hypothetical posed above, Astral Technologies 
and Illusion Beverages are engaged in patent litigation involving 
beverage products.  Alerted that its patented invention might be 
infringed, Astral collected and tested representative samples of 
Illusion’s products according to standard practices and procedures, 
and determined that Illusion’s products met all of the elements of 
 
 113. National Car-Brake Shoe Co. v. Terra Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 19 F. 514, 520 (D. 
Ind. 1884).  Thereafter, the court instructed the jury that the principle of confusion of 
goods did not apply in that case:  “If there is any confusion, it is confusion in the book-
keeping, and not of the goods.  The brakes could not be mixed; one brake is always 
separable from another; and the burden is upon the plaintiff to show how many articles 
were made in infringement of its patent; and the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the 
infringement of only such number as upon the evidence you are satisfied were made by 
the defendants.”  
 114. Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 618–19. 
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Astral’s asserted patent claims.  Because it would be physically and 
economically impractical, if not impossible, for Astral to test 
beverages from every Illusion manufacturing plant, the representative 
sampling would normally be sufficient to fulfill Astral’s burden of 
proof on the issue of infringement.115   
However, during litigation, Illusion asserted that, while some of 
its plants might manufacture infringing products, other plants clearly 
do not.  Essentially, Illusion’s claim was that some of its beverages are 
manufactured in a different manner, resulting in a mixture of 
infringing and non-infringing products.  What happens next?  As is 
often the case in law, it depends.   
As discussed above, once the patentee meets its initial burden, 
the burden should shift to the accused infringer to refute the 
patentee’s infringement case.116  In order to successfully refute the 
patentee’s case, the accused infringer must present evidence—not just 
conjecture—that the test results for the representative samples should 
not be extrapolated to the entire product line or that the accused 
products should be apportioned in a certain manner.117   
In light of these guidelines, Astral’s representative sampling should 
be sufficient to fulfill Astral’s initial burden of proof, thereby shifting the 
burden to Illusion to refute the infringement findings.  Whether or not 
Illusion will be successful in refuting Astral’s findings will depend on 
whether the infringing and non-infringing beverages can be apportioned. 
If Illusion, like the defendant-accused infringer in the Tate case,118 
merely relies on unsupported contentions that “some” of its beverages 
are not infringing due to, for example, quality control problems, then the 
court should extrapolate Astral’s representative sampling to Illusion’s 
entire product line.  The rationale behind such burden-shifting is based 
on the court’s acceptance of circumstantial evidence and adverse 
 
 115. See San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Comm’n., 161 
F.3d 1347, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that the plaintiff-patentee “could not be 
expected to have test data” on every product from every lot and “was not required to test 
every [product], and that it would have been impossible for [the plaintiff-patentee] to have 
done so . . . .”). 
 116. See, e.g., SRI, 775 F.2d at 1123–24; Ecolab, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 583. 
 117. See Ecolab, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (granting summary judgment on infringement in 
favor of the plaintiff-patentee because the defendant-accused infringer did not point to 
“any evidence to contradict the finding that the other elements of [the asserted claim] read 
on the [accused] products”). 
 118. Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 185 F. Supp. 594, 597 n.7 (D.N.J. 1960). 
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inferences to prove infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.119  
Equity also plays a large part in the analysis, as fairness requires that if 
the patentee’s inability to apportion between infringing and non-
infringing products is caused by the accused infringer, such risk should 
be borne by the accused infringer, not the patentee.120  Such inability may 
result from, for example, the accused infringer’s concealment or 
destruction of evidence or, simply, its failure to keep complete or 
accurate records.  Therefore, if Astral is unable, without testing every 
Illusion beverage, to determine which products are and are not 
infringing, then the court should hold Illusion accountable, and extend 
Astral’s representative sampling to Illusion’s entire product line.   
If, however, Illusion can point to specific, documented 
differences in the beverages produced at certain plants (e.g., water 
hardness; upgraded blenders/mixers) that would cause those products 
to fall outside Astral’s claim scope, then Illusion will have refuted 
Astral’s initial findings and shifted the burden back to Astral where 
those beverages are concerned.  At that point, Astral would have to 
conduct testing of products in the affected plants. 
In this respect, the infringement and damages analyses are 
essentially the same.  If the patentee has taken the steps outlined above 
and the accused infringer has been unable to refute the patentee’s 
infringement case, then the court should view the entire product line as 
infringing and award damages accordingly.  If, however, the accused 
infringer submits evidence showing the proper apportionment of 
infringing and non-infringing products, the court should only award 
damages for the infringing products.  Consequently, when inconsistent 
manufacturing processes are involved, parties can expect the courts to 
shift the burden back and forth between the patentee and accused 
infringer as new evidence is submitted. 
 
 119. See, e.g., Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1367 (setting preponderance of the evidence 
standard); Liquid Dynamics, 449 F.3d at 1219 (making evidentiary inferences and 
approving the use circumstantial evidence).   
 120. See, e.g., Automotive Parts, 81 F.2d at 127–28 (discussing rationale for shifting 
burden in repair/reconstruction case); Westinghouse, 131 F.2d 406, 409 (same); Del Mar 
Avionics, 836 F.2d at 1327 (“[W]hen the amount of the damages is not ascertainable with 
precision, reasonable doubt is appropriately resolved against the infringer.”); William 
Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F.2d at 739 (N.D. Ill. 1925)  (“[I]f one 
wrongfully mixes his own goods with those of another, so that they cannot be 
distinguished and separated, he shall lose the whole, for the reason that the fault is his.”); 
Sheldon, 309 U.S. at 405–06 (“Where there is a commingling of gains, [the infringer] must 
abide the consequences, unless he can make a separation of the profits so as to assure to 
the injured party all that justly belongs to him.”). 
